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Hinchey: The Fight to Safeguard American Drug Safety in the Twenty-First C

THE FIGHT TO SAFEGUARD AMERICAN DRUG
SAFETY IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY
Maurice Hinchey*

I.

INTRODUCTION

In the autumn of 2004, the United States faced a public health crisis
when Merck & Co., Inc. announced a voluntary withdrawal of Vioxx
(rofecoxib), a nonsteroidal anti-inflammatory drug ("NSAID") that had
first been approved by the Food and Drug Administration in May 1999.1
Over 100 million prescriptions for Vioxx had been written for 20 million
consumers, 2 and the FDA subsequently estimated that as many as 55,000
of those consumers3 suffered fatal heart attacks or strokes from their
ingestion of Vioxx.
In earlier decades, incidents similar to the Vioxx revelation served
as the impetus for great reform to our consumer protection standards.
The modem FDA was born out of such experience, first after the
dispersal of Elixir Sulfanilamide across our country in September and
October 1937,4 and then after Europe's thalidomide tragedy in the early
1960s. 5 Through such crises, the FDA evolved over the twentieth
century into an agency meant to carry out two distinct but related

*

Member of the United States House of Representatives (D-NY).
1. FDA, Vioxx (rofecoxib) Questions and Answers, http://www.fda.gov/cder/drug/infopage/
vioxx/vioxxQA.htm (last visited Mar. 20, 2007).
2. Bamaby J. Feder, Vioxx Recall May Bring Flood of Suits to Merck, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 5,
2004, at C2; see also Paul Harasim, ConcernedPatients: DrugNews Has Doctors in Dilemma, LAS
VEGAS REv.-J., Jan. 2, 2005, at IB ("In September, Vioxx, an arthritis and acute pain medication
taken by an estimated 80 million people worldwide, was taken off the market when studies showed
it increased the risk for heart attacks and stroke.").
3. Gardiner Harris, F.D.A. Official Admits 'Lapses' on Vioxx, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 2, 2005, at
A15.

4. Carol Ballentine, Taste of Raspberries, Taste of Death: The 1937 Elixir Sulfanilamide
Incident, FDA CONSUMER, June 1981, at 18, availableat http://www.fda.gov/oc/history/elixir.html.
5. See Herbert Burkholz, Giving Thalidomide a Second Chance,FDA CONSUMER, Sept.-Oct.
1997, availableat http://www.fda.gov/fdac/features/1997/697_thal.html.
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healthcare goals on behalf of the American people: to approve new
drugs, biologics and medical devices, and then to oversee the safe use of
these products within the marketplace.
The Vioxx crisis, the resulting investigations, and the ensuing
lawsuits-14,000 of which remain outstanding in state and federal
courts6 -strongly underscored a number of deficiencies within the
FDA's review and monitoring systems. Recent polls have shown that the
agency has lost the public trust as well as the confidence of its
employees.7 Therefore, one certainly might have anticipated another
wave of reform in the wake of the Vioxx incident.

II. THE FDA: PROBLEMS AND A PROPOSED SOLUTION
As a member of the House Appropriations Subcommittee which
has oversight of the FDA, I have come to believe that this agency is
broken and must be fixed as soon as possible. That is why I introduced
legislation, the FDA Improvement Act of 2005,8 to address many of the
regulatory and leadership problems that trouble our current drug
approval and safety oversight activities.
The vast majority of these problems can be traced back to one
single, undeniable issue: The pharmaceutical industry has supplanted the
American people as the FDA's primary client and number one concern.
Until we are able to reestablish the consumer as the number one priority
for the FDA, our nation's public health will remain at risk and the
credibility of this once great institution will continue to decline.
The instigation of much of the current failures of the FDA is the
Prescription Drug User Fee Act ("PDUFA"), which was enacted and
signed into law in 1992. 9 Called "the cornerstone of modern FDA drug
review," 10 the statute was created to reduce the FDA's drug application

6. See Alex Berenson, Legal Stance May Pay off For Merck, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 4, 2006, at
Cl.
7. See Harris Interactive, The FDA's Reputation with the General Public is Under Assault
(May 26, 2006), http://www.harrisinteractive.com/news/allnewsbydate.asp?NewslD=1060; see also
the
FDA
Scientist
Survey,
Scientists,
Summary
of
Union
of
Concerned
(last
http://www.ucsusa.org/scientific-integrity/interference/fda-scientists-survey-summary.html
visited Mar. 20, 2007).
8. FDA Improvement Act of2005, H.R. 2090, 109th Cong. (1998).
9. Prescription Drug User Fee Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-571, 106 Stat. 4491 (codified as
amended at 21 U.S.C. § 379g note (2000)).
10. See FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., WHITE PAPER PRESCRIPTION DRUG USER FEE ACT (PDUFA):
ADDING RESOURCES AND IMPROVING PERFORMANCE IN FDA REVIEW OF NEW DRUG

APPLICATIONS 1, available at http://www.fda.gov/oc/pdufa/PDUFAWlhitePaper.pdf (last visited
Mar. 20, 2007).
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review times by charging petitioners application, marketing, and
establishment fees in return for an expedited review and approval
process. Unfortunately, over the fifteen years of its existence, PDUFA
has become one of the main sources of the hostile takeover of the FDA
by the drug companies.
The conditions of the expedited drug approval process under
PDUFA have become more onerous with each reauthorization of this
legislation." At the same time, since fiscal year 2004, the agency has
relied upon these fees to cover about fifty-three percent of all funds
expended on the review of human drug applications.' 2 This percentage
has been steadily increasing since the first enactment of PDUFA in
1992, creating a strong financial dependency of the FDA on the
companies it is supposed to oversee and regulate.
This financial dependency, along with the FDA's constant
negotiations with companies over how to spend the fees, became the
foundation for the cozy relationship that exists today between the FDA
and the pharmaceutical industry. PDUFA's 2007 reauthorization should
include substantive reforms to sever the inappropriate behavior
engendered by this statute. My FDA Improvement Act cuts the direct
financial link between the FDA and the drug industry by prohibiting the
FDA from collecting fees directly from companies. Instead, the bill
redirects those fees to the general fund of the U.S. Treasury and creates
mandatory funding levels to cover the cost of the FDA functions now
paid by drug companies. It also prohibits the FDA from negotiating with
drug companies over the agency's budget and ends such previous
agreements between the FDA and those companies.

11. PDUFA I (in effect from 1992-1997) required the FDA to use fees to turn around drug
applications quickly, completing priority reviews in six months and standard reviews in twelve
months. The legislation also required the FDA to complete manufacturing supplement reviews and
resubmitted applications within six months. PDUFA Ii (in effect from 1997-2002) upgraded the
timeline for the FDA to complete standard drug reviews to ten months, manufacturing supplement
reviews to four months, and certain resubmitted applications to two months. PDUFA II also
instituted new standards for responses to industry requests for meetings and resolutions of disputes
appealed by industry, among other items. PDUFA III (in effect from 2002-2007) continues all of the
standards outlined in PDUFA I and upgraded in PDUFA 11, and adds requirements that the FDA
will issue discipline review letters, report substantive deficiencies in New Drug Applications, and
complete reviews of efficacy supplements within certain periods of time, while also enhancing
electronic applications receipts and reviews by the end of fiscal year 2007. See FOOD & DRUG
ADMIN.,

PDUFA

III

FIVE-YEAR

PLAN

(July

2003),

available at

http://www.fda.gov

/oc/pdufa3/2003plan/default.htm. See also Notice of Public Meeting, Prescription Drug User Fee
Act, 72 Fed. Reg. 1743, 1743-45 (Jan. 16, 2007).
12.

See FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., FY 2004 PDUFA FINANCIAL REPORT, available at

http://www.fda.gov/oc/pdufa/finreport2004/report.html (last visited Mar. 20, 2007).
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My legislation also takes significant steps to strengthen the FDA's
efforts to protect consumers once approved drugs have reached the
market. Unfortunately, while the agency currently spends the vast
majority of its PDUFA funds on pre-market activities, and has great
spent
authority to oversee these approval efforts, the agency has only
13
initiatives.
postmarket
on
fees
PDUFA
its
of
percent
five
about
Furthermore, the agency has minimal authority to conduct followup activities on drugs once they have been approved. Unlike its abilities
on the drug approval front, the FDA's options on the drug safety front
are reduced to pleading for small changes-such as trying to convince
pharmaceutical companies to behave correctly regarding required
postmarket studies, drug labeling, and safety warnings-and is only able
to enforce one major change: declaring a drug misbranded and yanking
it from the market-an action that is rarely used.
Here is one example of the FDA's impotence on the post-market
front: As of September 30, 2005, there were 1231 incomplete
postmarketing studies that had been requested by the FDA upon drug
approval. Sixty-five percent of those studies had not been started yet,
and were thus classified as pending. 14 Aside from those matters focusing
on drugs whose approval processes have been accelerated, while it may
request as much postmarket analysis as it deems appropriate, the FDA
has no authority to force these studies to completion. The significant
amount of direct financial support that the agency receives from the
companies it is trying to monitor also interferes with this process.
To make matters worse, responsibility for postmarket drug safety is
managed by the Center for Drug Evaluation and Research ("CDER"),
the same Center that carries out the initial approval of new drugs. Earlier
this year CDER reorganized its drug safety activities for the fifth time in
a decade, creating an Associate Director for Safety Policy and
Communications, in an alleged attempt to strengthen the postmarket
position within the FDA. This effort seems to have little or no value,
especially since under this arrangement, the well-documented' 5 friction
13. See U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, DRUG SAFETY: IMPROVEMENT NEEDED IN
FDA's POSTMARKET DECISION-MAKING AND OVERSIGHT PROCESS 7-8 (2006) (explaining that
while "[i]n fiscal year 2005, more than half of OND's expenditures, or $57.2 million, came from
PDUFA funds," only "$7.6 million of ODS's expenditures were from PDUFA funds").
14. Notice of Availability, Report on the Performance of Drug and Biologics Finns in
Conducting Postmarketing Commitment Studies, 71 Fed. Reg. 10,978, 10,979 (Mar. 3, 2006).
15. See U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 13, at 4-6, 18-24; see also COMM.
ON THE ASSESSMENT OF THE U.S. DRUG SAFETY SYS. AND BD. ON POPULATION HEALTH & PUB.
HEALTH PRACTICE, THE FUTURE OF DRUG SAFETY: PROMOTING AND PROTECTING THE HEALTH OF
THE PUBLIC, at 3-2 (Alina Baciu et al. eds., 2006).
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between staff responsible for new drugs and those responsible for
postmarket drug safety continues to scrape together. This friction
appears to be a long-standing internal problem borne out of the
aforementioned discrepancies in funding and authority.
The FDA Improvement Act would create an independent Center for
Drug Safety and Effectiveness. The Center would be within the FDA,
but the Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services
would appoint its director. Different doctors and scientists than the ones
who approve a drug would monitor its safety once it hit the market. The
Center would also be given increased funding and authority to
strengthen the FDA's post-market regulatory functions. Additionally, the
FDA Improvement Act would empower the FDA and the new Center
with the authority to force companies to actually carry out postmarketing studies of FDA-approved drugs, mandate changes to drug
labels, impose civil penalties, require patient and doctor education
programs, and release to the public critical information about drug safety
and effectiveness.
While the FDA Improvement Act would do much to address the
structural problems that have been plaguing the FDA's efforts to
guarantee drug safety, it is important to note that even this solution will
be imperfect absent true executive reform at the agency. There has been
no permanent commissioner at the FDA during much of the Bush
Administration. Meanwhile, many of those in appointed leadership
positions at the agency appear to be twisting its efforts for their
professional-and even personal-gain. A prime example of this
travesty can be found in the efforts of Daniel Troy, the FDA's Chief
Counsel from 2001 to 2004.
During his time at the agency, Mr. Troy wasted taxpayer money on
ideological pursuits that undermined the FDA's basic missions. For the
first time in history, the FDA's Chief Counsel actively sought out
private industrial company lawyers to bring him cases in which the FDA6
could intervene in support of drug and medical device manufacturers.1
The cases he pursued were private state civil litigation cases. These are
cases in which the court did not ask for FDA opinion, involving drug
and medical device manufacturers who were being sued by people

16.

Catherine T. Struve, The FDA and the Tort System: Postmarketing Surveillance,

Compensation, and the Role of Litigation, 5 YALE J. HEALTH POL'Y L. & ETHICS 587, 589 n.5

(2005).
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harmed by their products. 17 During his time at the FDA, Mr. Troy set a
new and terrible precedent that is still being pursued, albeit not as
actively, by the agency.
III.

CONCLUSION

The FDA Improvement Act would allow the public to hold drug
companies accountable by reversing the preemption policy employed by
the FDA since 2001 and restoring the policy used by the FDA for the
previous quarter-century. This would ensure that individual state
consumer protections, and other methods through which states hold
companies legally liable, are not preempted by FDA regulations unless
there is a clear and direct conflict between an FDA regulation and a state
regulation.
For the purposes of public protection, the FDA is one of the most
important agencies of the federal government. Unfortunately, the
agency's struggles with regulatory and statutory obstacles are keeping it
from effectively executing its mandate. The FDA Improvement Act
would do much to address these difficulties, and restore the FDA to its
rightful position as defender of the public health.

17. Richard C. Ausness, "After You, My Dear Alphonse!": Should the Courts Defer to the
FDA's New Interpretationof§ 360k(a) of the Medical Device Amendments?, 80 TUL. L. REV. 727,
755-58 (2006).
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